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Bentwood: Deficiency Judgment Relief in Montana Foreclosures

COMMENTS

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT RELIEF IN MONTANA
FORECLOSURES
Margaret K. Bentwood
I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, in the United States strict foreclosure, in which a
debtor loses all equity in the realty and title vests immediately in
the creditor, has been replaced with foreclosure by power of sale
and judicial procedure. These newer forms of foreclosure carry
with them, respectively, anti-deficiency provisions and rights of
possession and redemption. 1 These changes reflect an important
public policy underlying mortgage foreclosure law: the protection
of debtors from unreasonable losses.2 In Montana, foreclosure law
has become somewhat unsettled in recent years because of Montana Supreme Court decisions that appear to unduly favor debtors
over creditors. However, careful examination of the relevant statutes and judicial opinions shows that neither the Montana Legislature nor Montana courts favor debtors over creditors in mortgage
foreclosure. In fact, recent Montana Supreme Court opinions evidence an intricate balancing of creditors' and debtors' rights and,
if anything, show a slight favoritism of creditors over debtors.
A case in point is Trustees of the Washington-Idaho-Montana Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund v. Galleria
Partnership3 [Galieria I and Galleria II]. The. Galleria I case represents the first time that the Montana Supreme Court invalidated
a foreclosure sale price on inadequacy of price grounds and instructed the district court on remand to credit the debtors with the
1. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto
Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 858 (1985).
2. David J. Dietrich, The Montana Judicial and Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale:
Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 49 MONT. L. REV.-285, 331 (1988).
3. 239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (1989) [hereinafter Galleria I], remanded and appealed, Trustees of the Washington-Idaho-Montana Carpenters-Employers Retirement
Trust Fund v. Galleria Partnership, Mont. -,
819 P.2d 158 (1991) [hereinafter Galleria II].
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fair market value of the debtors' property. Nevertheless, the facts
of Galleria I and Galleria II show that ultimately the Montana
Supreme Court granted the debtors a Pyrrhic victory.
After describing the factual background of Trustees of the
Washington-Idaho-Montana Carpenters-Employers Retirement
Trust Fund v. GalleriaPartnership,this comment will present the
two major holdings of the majority opinion, followed by the position taken in the dissenting opinion. The comment will then analyze the opinion by discussing a prior decision leading up to the
GalleriaI appeal and a later decision which shows a judicial trend
toward disallowing such appeals. Next this comment will describe
the additional background of the second appeal of Trustees of the
Washington-Idaho-Montana Carpenters-Employers Retirement
Trust Fund v. Galleria Partnership.After presenting the holding,
the comment will analyze the Galleria II opinion regarding the fair
market value issue. The comment will then describe the future of
fair market value credits in Montana foreclosures. After presenting
several suggestions for statutory reform, the comment concludes by
predicting that the Montana Supreme Court will uphold GalleriaI
and Galleria II, but with some limitations.
II.
A.

GALLERIA I

Background

Under longstanding Montana mortgage laws, foreclosure can
be accomplished by two methods: a power of sale4 or judicial procedure. 5 Montana allows lenders to foreclose instruments securing
real property through judicial procedure by providing for a sheriff's
sale followed by a docketing of a deficiency judgment.' The deficiency judgment represents the difference between the amount bid
at the sheriff's sale, less plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees, and
the full amount of the defendant's obligation.7 Foreclosure by judicial procedure benefits debtors by allowing them to retain possession of their property for one year, if the property is used for residential purposes. 8 Additionally, foreclosure by judicial procedure
provides the debtor with a one-year right to redeem the property
4. A power of sale allows the lender to sell the real property to a third party under the
terms of the security instrument, but no additional money is sought from the borrower even
if the sale price fails to meet the original obligation. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-223 to 225 (1991).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1991).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222(2) (1991).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222(2) (1991).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-821 (1991).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/6

2

Bentwood: Deficiency Judgment Relief in Montana Foreclosures
19921

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT RELIEF

from the purchaser at foreclosure for the amount bid plus certain
costs and interest.'
The Great Depression led many states, including Montana, to
pass legislation limiting deficiency judgments in mortgage foreclosures. After the passage of an anti-deficiency statute by the Montana Legislature in 1935,0 Montana lenders found themselves unable to obtain deficiency judgments following purchase-money
mortgage foreclosures. Furthermore, as noted above, they were also
unable to possess the foreclosed property for the statutory oneyear redemption period. Desiring to dispose of these foreclosed
properties more quickly, lenders proposed the Small Tract Financing Act to the Montana Legislature. The purpose of the Small
Tract Financing Act of 1963 (the Act) was to promote the lending
and banking industry by encouraging the use of deeds of trust, also
called trust indentures. Under the Act, trust indentures would take
away borrowers' rights of possession and redemption.' 1 The lending and banking industry wished to void debtors' rights of possession and redemption because those rights caused lenders' funds to
be tied up during the statutory redemption period. 2 In what many
call the "quid pro quo" which led to the passage of the Act, the
lending and banking industry agreed to release their right to the
13
deficiency judgment for all foreclosures of trust indentures.
Thereafter, under the Act, lenders had no right to deficiency judgments and borrowers had no rights to possession or redemption.
The plain language of the Small Tract Financing Act itself
seemed to provide lenders with not one but two options." First,
lenders could foreclose deeds of trust by a power of sale with no
related right of possession, right of redemption, or deficiency judgment.1 5 And second, lenders could foreclose deeds of trust by a
traditional judicial procedure method, as found in the mortgage
statutes, providing for the right of possession, right of redemption,
and deficiency judgment.' 6
9.
10.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 25-13-802 (1991).
§ 71-1-232 (1991).

11. Galleria 1,239 Mont. 250, 256-57, 780 P.2d 608, 612.
12. Id.
13. First State Bank of Forsyth v. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 57, 734 P.2d 1203, 1205
(1987), cited with approval in Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 257, 780 P.2d 608, 612.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1991).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(2) (1991) (power of sale conferred); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-319 (1991) (bidder takes possession on the 10th day following sale); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-228 (1991) (right of redemption not to apply to trust indentures under the Small
Tract Financing Act); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1991) (anti-deficiency statute).
16. This was the relief requested by plaintiff First State Bank of Forsyth in
Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 59, 734 P.2d 1203, 1206. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-
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Although lenders usually prefer to foreclose under the Act to
gain immediate possession of the property,1 7 lenders often desire
the deficiency judgment gained by judicial foreclosure when prices
in the real estate market fall"8 or when the debtor has significant
assets subject to a deficiency judgment. In a rising real estate market the lender may prefer to foreclose under the Act to gain immediate possession. In a falling market the lender may prefer to foreclose under the mortgage statutes in order to obtain a deficiency
judgment for the difference between what it could get on the market and the full amount of the obligation.
The problem which confronts many courts is that even in a
falling real estate market there is a fine line between making a
suitably low bid and "economic overreaching."' 9 The lender's bid
might take unfair advantage of the depressed market. In such
cases, the deficiency judgment constitutes a "double recovery," because the lender acquires both the property and a sizeable deficiency judgment as well.2" In addition, when the occasional debtor
has significant assets available to cover a deficiency judgment,
lenders frequently prefer to foreclose under mortgage statutes.
This option allows the lender to make a low bid at the foreclosure
sale and obtain a large deficiency judgment. This too can be characterized as a "double recovery,"
B.

Facts and Procedure

In 1982, sixteen Great Falls residents formed the Galleria
Partnership (the Partnership) to purchase a warehouse which the
previous owner had remodeled to house numerous businesses. 2'
Together, the partners made a cash down payment of $800,000 on
the property.2 2 On March' 17, 1982, these individuals executed a
222(2) (1991) (deficiency statute); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-821 (1991) (possession statute);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801 (1991) (redemption statute).
17. See Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 58, 734 P.2d 1203, 1205 ("[Tlhe use of trust deeds
for security purposes has become nearly exclusive in this state.").
18. Id. at 63, 734 P.2d at 1208.
19. "Economic overreaching" is the term used by the Ninth Circuit Court in United
States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975), to describe "artificially low bids"
made by creditors at foreclosure sales.
20. By waiting until the property recovers its value, the lender can theoretically recover both the full value of the property and the full value of the property again in the form
of a deficiency judgment. "Double recovery" is a term used by the Ninth Circuit in MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42 (9th Cir. 1975), to describe the "artificially large deficiencies" which
result when creditors make "artificially low bids" at foreclosure sales; see also GRANT S.
NELSON AND DALE A. WHITMAN. REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW § 8.3, at 604 (2d ed. 1985).
21. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 253, 780 P.2d 608, 610.
22. Appellant's Initial Brief at 10, Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (1989) (No.
89-029).
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$1,200,000 promissory note to the Trustees of the WashingtonIdaho-Montana Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund
(Retirement Trust). 3 That same day, ten of the individuals and
three others executed a trust indenture and security agreement to
secure the $1,200,000 loan, with interest, under the promissory
note. 4
In 1981, the warehouse had been appraised at $1,950,000.25
The Partnership used this appraisal to justify their request for the
$1,200,000 loan from the Retirement Trust.2 6 In 1985, after the
Partnership defaulted on its monthly payments and after the Retirement Trust filed a complaint, the Retirement Trust obtained a
second appraisal of $1,100,000.27
On April 12, 1985, the Retirement Trust filed a complaint in
District Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, to foreclose the trust indenture securing Galleria's 1982 loan in the
amount of $1,200,000.26 On October 29, 1987, the district court
granted summary judgment to the Retirement Trust and ordered a
sheriff's foreclosure sale, which took place on December 8, 1987.9
At this foreclosure sale, the sole bidder was the Retirement
Trust.3 0 The Retirement Trust purchased the property for
$565,000.3' The district court entered a deficiency judgment
against Galleria by subtracting the Retirement Trust's bid of
interest owing on the $1.2 million
$565,000 from the principal and
32
loan and the costs of the sale.
The district court's final judgment for plaintiff Retirement
Trust was $1,505,368.35. 33 Of that total amount, $1,308,193.35 represented the deficiency judgment (plus the interest on the obligation which accrued after default), and $197,175.00 was for costs
and attorneys' fees.3 4 From that final judgment the defendant Galleria appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
23.
24.

Galleria I, at 253, 780 P.2d at 609.
Id. at 253, 780 P.2d at 610.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 263, 780 P.2d at 616.
at 255, 780 P.2d at 611.
at 256, 780 P.2d at 611.

at 252, 780 P.2d at 609.
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The Holdings

1. A Deficiency Judgment is Permissible under the Small Tract
FinancingAct of 1963
The first issue the Montana Supreme Court addressed was
whether a trust indenture executed in conformity with the Small
Tract Financing Act of 196331 and foreclosed by judicial proceedings could be the basis for a deficiency judgment.3 6 The court had
interpreted the pertinent statutes of the Act just two months
before the filing of the Retirement Trust's 37initial complaint in
First State Bank of Forsyth v. Chunkapura.
In Chunkapura, the court held that it would not allow deficiency judgments under the Act because "advertisement and
sale"3 " (which the Act does not define) applied to judicial procedure foreclosures. 3 s The court defined judicial foreclosures as having an advertisement and sale procedure because the plaintiff advertises the sheriff's sale in the legal section of a newspaper of
general circulation.4" On rehearing, the court modified this holding
to apply only to foreclosures where the real property involved was
an occupied, single-family residential dwelling.4 1 The court stated
explicitly that under the Act commercial borrowers would indeed
be liable for deficiency judgments upon judicial foreclosure of their
trust indentures. 2 The court justified its position by stating that
the purpose of the Act was to effect a quid pro quo between borrowers and the lending and banking industry so that the borrowers
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1991). This section provides that:
When a trust indenture executed in conformity with this part is foreclosed by
advertisement and sale, no other or further action, suit, or proceedings shall be
taken or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor or his surety,
guarantor, or successor in interest, if any, on the note, bond or other obligation
secured by the trust indenture or against any other person obligated on such note,
bond, or other obligation.
But the Act also provides that:
A trust indenture executed in conformity with this part may be foreclosed by advertisement and sale in the manner provided in this part or, at the option of the
beneficiary, by judicial procedure as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without
express provision in the trust indenture.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
36. Galleria I, at 256-58, 780 P.2d at 611-13.
37. 226 Mont. 54, 734 P.2d 1203 (1987).
38. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 71-1-317 (1991). This provision denies all deficiency judgments
when the trust indenture is foreclosed by "advertisement and sale."
39. Chunkapura, at 63, 734 P.2d at 1208.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 67, 734 P.2d at 1211.
42. Id. at 66-67, 734 P.2d at 1210-11.
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would give up the right to possess their real property and the oneyear period of redemption in return for the lenders giving up their
right to a deficiency judgment. 43 The Chunkapura court ruled that
since the legislature intended the Act to benefit homeowners and
small business expansions of not more than three acres, its antideficiency provision should not benefit commercial borrowers.4 4
In Galleria I the Montana Supreme Court confronted a commercial borrower who stood in a position similar to the debtors in
Chunkapura.5 Although the Galleria Partnership argued that it
intended its loan for a business expansion, the court was unpersuaded.4 1 The court affirmed the modified Chunkapura decision
and held that the Small Tract Financing Act allows deficiency
judgments when lenders foreclose the trust indentures of commercial borrowers by judicial procedure.4
2. Sitting as a Court of Equity, the District Court May Take Evidence of the Fair Market Value of the Real Property to Determine the Deficiency Judgment
The second major issue which the Montana Supreme Court
addressed in Galleria I was whether the amount of the deficiency
judgment was fair. 8 The court asserted that a foreclosure action is
an action in equity, which allows the court to "determine any other
equities existing between the parties connected with the main subject of the suit, and grant all relief necessary to the entire adjustment of the subject."4 9 The court held that the district court, acting as a court of equity, had the authority to hear the evidence of
both parties regarding the fair market value of the real property,
and if that value were significantly higher than the $565,000 bid by
the Retirement Trust at the sheriff's sale, to use the higher fair
market value as the basis for determining any deficiency judgment." In arriving at its holding, the court emphasized again that
the property had been valued at $1,950,000 in 1981 and at
$1,100,000 in 1985, but purchased for $565,000 in 1987.51 The court
remanded the action to the district court for determination of the
43. Id. at 66, 734 P.2d at 1210.
44. Id. at 66-67, 734 P.2d at 1210.
45. Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 258, 780 P.2d 608, 613.
46. Id. at 257, 780 P.2d at 612.
47. Id. at 257-58, 780 P.2d at 612-13.
48. Id. at 263, 780 P.2d at 616.
49. Tiffany v. Uhde, 123 Mont. 507, 512-13, 216 P.2d 375, 378 (1950), cited with approval in Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
50. Galleria I, at 265, 780 P.2d at 617.
51. Id. at 263-64, 780 P.2d at 616.
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fair market value of the property.52 The court thus attempted to
prevent the possibility of double recovery by the Retirement Trust,
which wanted both the property, last valued at more than
$1,000,000, and a deficiency judgment for $1,308,193.35, all in compensation for the Partnership's default on a $1,200,000
obligation. 3
D.

The Dissent

Justice McDonough's dissenting opinion focused upon the remand to the district court for fair market value determination. The
dissent based its objections upon statutory and procedural matters.
The dissent first argued that there was no statutory basis for a fair
market value determination of deficiency judgments. On that basis
alone Justice McDonough would have held that the deficiency
judgment of $1,308,193.35 was proper. 4 Furthermore, the dissent
reasoned that because the defendant Galleria never questioned the
propriety of the actual amount of the deficiency judgment, either
in the lower court proceedings or in its appeal, the court should
55
never have addressed that issue at all.
E.

Analysis

This analysis of Galleria I first explores the court's authority
to require a fair market valuation credit upon remand. Next the
analysis focuses upon how the court initially found the price inadequacy. Finally, this analysis notes a shift in the prevailing supreme
court winds and what that means for the future of fair market valuation credit in Montana foreclosures.
1. Deficiency Judgments Permissible
Deficiency judgments are not available to lenders foreclosing
under the Small Tract Financing Act for occupied, single-family
residential property.5 6 The GalleriaI court builds its analysis upon
Chunkapura. In Chunkapura, the debtors had executed a deed of
trust on October 20, 1980 to secure a $17,000 promissory note allowing them to purchase the lot for their family home in Forsyth,
Montana." The Chunkapuras made approximately $11,999.20 in
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 264, 780 P.2d at 616.
Galleria I, at 270, 780 P.2d at 620 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
Id.
Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 67, 734 P.2d 1203, 1211.
Id. at 55, 734 P.2d at 1203.
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payments of principal and interest before they defaulted in 1985.58
The plaintiff, First State Bank of Forsyth, filed for a foreclosure
action under judicial procedure, requesting both a sale and a deficiency judgment."8 At the sheriff's sale, the Bank, the sole bidder,
bid $10,000.0 After the sheriff's fees and attorneys' fees were deducted, the Bank requested the district court to docket a deficiency judgment of $8,556.93.61'
The Chunkapuras fought the deficiency judgment on two
grounds. First, they argued that Montana Code Annotated section
71-1-305 prohibits deficiency judgments as inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act. 2 They argued that the purpose of the Act was
to encourage the lending and banking industry by taking away borrowers' rights to possession and redemption after foreclosure, and
that, in return, lenders had to give up their rights to deficiency
judgments. 3 Second, the Chunkapuras argued that Montana Code
Annotated section 71-1-317, which states that no deficiency judgment can be allowed when the property is sold by advertisement
and sale, applies not only to power of sale but judicial procedure as
well, because even under judicial procedure there is advertisement
and sale."'
The Montana Supreme Court accepted the Chunkapuras' arguments and held that Montana Code Annotated section 71-1-317
prohibited any deficiency judgment under the Act. 5 The court
stated that while the Act appears to permit judicial foreclosure, it
does not also provide for the rights of possession, redemption, and
deficiency. 6 Further, the court stated that to allow a deficiency
would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Act.67 To
arrive at this holding, the Montana Supreme Court strained to find
some ambiguity in the Act which would allow the court to forbid a
deficiency judgment against the Chunkapuras6 8
The Chunkapura opinion is best understood by looking at the
equities. The Chunkapuras were going to lose their property valued at perhaps $17,000, approximately $11,999.20 in payments of
58. Id. at 55, 734 P.2d at 1204.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 59, 734 P.2d at 1206.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 63, 734 P.2d 1203, 1208.
66. Id. at 60, 734 P.2d at 1206.
67. Id. at 63, 734 P.2d at 1208.
68. Kathleen M. Magone, First State Bank v. Chunkapura: New Limitations on
Trust Indentures, 49 MONT. L. REV. 181, 196 (1988).
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principal and interest,6 9 $8,556.93 in a deficiency judgment,"" and
attorneys' fees. After the Chunkapura rehearing, however, the
court narrowed its holding to apply only to occupied, single-family
residential property.7" The court made it clear that the "quid pro
quo" which "secured passage of the Act" was not intended by the
legislature to benefit commercial borrowers, although the court
cited no authority for that assertion beyond the personal knowledge of the justices.7 2
In Galleria I, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed and approved the Chunkapura decision as it applied to a commercial borrower. 3 The court again noted that there is no provision under the
Act for any right to possess or redeem either for residential or
commercial borrowers, 4 but that deficiency judgments could be
docketed against commercial borrowers. 75 The court appealed to
the legislature for attention to the matter, but noted that two legislative sessions had passed since the court's previous request for
76
statutory revision in Chunkapura.
2. Fair Market Valuations Permissible
Faced now with a commercial borrower against whom a catastrophic deficiency judgment might be docketed, the Galleria I
court invoked its equity power to require a fair adjustment of the
equities between the parties. On remand, the court ordered the
district court to determine the fair market value of the property
before docketing a deficiency judgment. To come to this decision,
the court relied upon three sources of authority: the statutes of
other western states which require fair market valuations; a 1975
Ninth Circuit opinion which applied a fair market valuation statute; and Montana Code Annotated section 3-2-204(5), which allows
the Montana Supreme Court to sit as a court of equity and gives
the court broad powers to make adjustments between the parties.
69. Chunkapura, at 55, 734 P.2d at 1204.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 76, 734 P.2d at 1211.
72. The court never cites its specific source (beyond the statement of intent within the
Act itself) for the legislative intent supporting the "quid pro quo." The court simply states
that "[tihe history of the legislative adoption of that Act [is] not unknown to some members
of this Court .... " Id. at 56, 734 P.2d at 1204. It should be noted that one of the majority in
Chunkapura, Chief Justice Jean A. Turnage, was a member of the Montana House of Representatives when the Small Tract Financing Act was passed in 1963.
73. Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 256-58, 780 P.2d 608, 611-13.
74. The court states that "[t]he Small Tract Financing Act... makes no provision for
any right of redemption ....
Id. at 256, 780 P.2d at 611-12.
75. Id. at 258, 780 P.2d at 613.
76. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/6

10

1992]

Bentwood: Deficiency Judgment Relief in Montana Foreclosures

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT RELIEF

First, the court reviewed the statutes of other western jurisdictions such as California, Washington, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Oregon, and Alaska for their persuasive authority." All of these western states except Alaska require some type of fair market valuation
as a basis for determining deficiency judgments.78 In addition,
South Dakota and North Dakota also provide for fair market valuations by statute.7 9
Second, the court drew upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's characterization of deficiency judgments as being unjust
when not based upon fair market value.80 In United States v. MacKenzie, the lower court had refused to follow a Nevada law which
calculates fair market value into the deficiency judgment. 8 ' The
Court of Appeals reversed. 2 ' The court stated that "depriving the
[plaintiff] of potential 'double recoveries' created by artificially
large deficiencies that [plaintiff] has caused takes away nothing to
which [plaintiff] is entitled. 8 3 The McKenzie opinion argued that
mortgagee bids at foreclosure sales should be based upon fair market value. Furthermore, "economic overreaching" best describes
what happens when the foreclosing lender makes a low bid at foreclosure sale.8 " Thus the Galleria I court drew upon the persuasive
power of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's strong condemnation
of double recoveries and economic overreaching by lenders.
Third, the Montana Supreme Court sought a solution to the
problem through its powers of equity. Legal scholars and courts
have traditionally understood foreclosure actions to be actions in
equity.8 5 In Galleria I, the Montana Supreme Court invoked its
equity power as provided by Montana statute.8 6 From this statute,
77. Id. at 264, 780 P.2d at 616.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975), cited with approval
in Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 264-65, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
81. 510 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 43.
83. Id. at 42.
84. Id.
85. As early as 1904, the Montana Supreme Court asserted its equitable power to overturn a grossly inadequate foreclosure sale price in Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 286, 76 P.
563, 565 (1904) (dictum) (reciting with approval the mere inadequacy of price plus additional circumstances exception). See generally Dietrich, supra note 2, at 318.
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-2-204(5). This statute provides:
[fin equity cases and in matters and proceedings of an equitable nature, the supreme court shall review all questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented
in the record, whether the same be presented by specifications of particulars in
which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient or not, and determine the same, as
well as questions of law, unless for good cause a new trial or the taking of further
evidence in the court below be ordered. Nothing herein shall be construed to
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the court justified its review of the facts in Galleria 1.87 The equitable power provided by this statute allowed the court on appeal to
readjust the equities between the parties without a specific allegation of error. By invoking the persuasive authority of other western
states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Montana Supreme Court showed the need for using fair market valuation to
calculate the deficiency judgment. By invoking the mandatory authority of Montana statutory law in equitable proceedings, the
Montana Supreme Court justified its use of the equity power to
satisfy that need.
The dissent's argument that there is no specific statutory authority for using fair market valuation in foreclosure sales is thus
immaterial to the Montana Supreme Court when sitting in equity. 8 Because of the broad equity powers of adjustment granted
to the court by Montana Code Annotated section 3-2-204(5), the
dissent's objection that the defendants never raised the issue of
fair market value in the district court is simply irrelevant to the
court when sitting in equity. But the dissent's argument that the
defendants could have asked the district court to set aside the deficiency and order the property appraised should not be ignored, because it probably represents the safest way for borrowers to assert
their rights in foreclosure sales.
3.

The Finding of Price Inadequacy

When the Montana Supreme Court remanded Galleria I to
the district court for determination of fair market value, it did so
on the equitable theory that the price bid in by the mortgagee at
the sheriff's sale was inadequate.8 9 The court was not clear about
why the price was inadequate. The opinion hints at two possibilities. First, the court notes that the mortgagee's bid on the real
property was "approximately 30% of [the property's] original appraised value [and was] the basis for what must [have been] a catabridge in any manners the powers of the supreme court in other cases.
87. 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
88. See Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 855-56 (1980):
Even when the mortgagee exercises a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust,
equity has jurisdiction to grant relief upon petition by an injured party. Courts of
equity also have extensive inherent power in supervising judicial sales and wide
discretion in the exercise of that power. This discretion extends to grant or denial
of a deficiency judgment, to confirmation of the sale, and to vacating a confirmed
sale.
89. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 265, 780 P.2d at 617.
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astrophic deficiency judgment for the Partners." 90 Second, the
court stated that "Had the sole bid at the sheriff's sale for the
property here been for $100 or $1,000, undoubtedly we would be
moved by equity to inquire as to its fairness. The actual bid of
$565,000.00 is only a matter of degree."9 It is unclear whether the
court found the $565,000 bid inadequate because it was 30 percent
of the mortgagor's original purchase price or perhaps because the
sole bidder-the mortgagee-had made a relatively low bid.
The general rule in mortgage foreclosure is that any price bid
in at the foreclosure sale is adequate. 2 ' There are, however, two
fundamental equitable exceptions to this general rule in inadequacy of price cases. 93 These exceptions are not mutually exclusive;
both may operate at the same time. The first exception is the gross
inadequacy of price exception, accepted in a minority of states. 9
Montana has not adopted this rule.95 The second fundamental equitable exception in inadequacy of price cases is the mere inadequacy of price with additional circumstances exception, which is
90. Id. at 264, 780 P.2d at 616.
91. Id. at 265, 780 P.2d at 617 (emphasis added).
92. Speers Sand & Clay Works, Inc. v. American Trust Co., 52 F.2d 831, 835 (4th Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 548 (1932). Contra Wood v. Parker, 63 N.C. 373 (1869). See
Washburn, supra note 88, at 859.
93. See generally Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Inadequacy of Price as Basis for
Setting Aside Execution or Sheriff's Sale--Modern Cases, 5 A.L.R.4th 794 §§ 3-4 at 800-11
(1981).
94. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 291 (1907); Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180,
191-92 (1886) (reciting general rule and gross inadequacy exception with approval); United
States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968); Madison v. Ware, 171 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1965);
George v. Cone, 91 S.W. 557, 558 (Ark. 1905); Girard Trust Bank v. Castle Apart's, Inc., 379
A.2d 1144 (Del. 1977) (dictum); Van Senden v. O'Brien, 58 F.2d 689 (App. D.C. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 608 (1932); Maule Indus. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307, 311
(Fla. 1956); Williams v. Regent Motel Corp., 223 S.E.2d 225 (Ga. 1976); Hoge v. Kane, 670
P.2d 36 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); Butler v. Slattery, 237 N.W. 232 (Iowa 1931) (dictum); Straus
v. Anderson, 9 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Il1. 1937); Branck v. Foust, 30 N.E. 631 (Ind. 1892) (dictum); Wyandotte State Bank v. Murray, 114 P. 847, 849 (Kan. 1911); McCartney v. Frost,
386 A.2d 784 (Md. 1978) (dictum); Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 249 N.W. 844, 845 (Mich.
1933); Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 138 So.2d 484 (Miss. 1962); Brookshire v.
Powell, 335 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. 1960); Nebraska Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Patterson, 321
N.W.2d 71 (Neb. 1982); Hackettstown Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 6 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1938);
Southold Say. Bank v. Gilligan, 350 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (1973); Certain-Teed Prod. Corp. v.
Sanders, 141 S.E.2d 329, 337 (N.C. 1965); Commissioners of Land Office v. Harrower, 29
P.2d 123, 127 (Okla. 1934); Thompson v. Thompson, 378 P.2d 281 (Or. 1963); Capozzi v.
Antonoplos, 201 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1964); Anderson v. Anderson, 266 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1970); Howell
v. Gibson, 37 S.E.2d 271, 274-75 (S.C. 1946); Watson v. United Am. Bank in Knoxville, 588
S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. App. 1979); Greater Southwest Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Commerce
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1990); Sensenbrenner v. Keppler, 130 N.W.2d 177
(Wis. 1964).
95. See Fox v. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 220, 29 P.2d 663, 665 (1934) (quoting Burton v.
Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 286, 76 P. 563, 565 (1904)).
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accepted in a majority of states." Montana impliedly adopted this
exception in dicta in Burton v. Kipp, although it mislabelled the
exception as the gross inadequacy of price exception. 7
Under the gross inadequacy of price exception, a court may
hold that when a price bid in at a foreclosure sale results in "fundamentally unfair economic harm" to the mortgagor, the mortgagor should receive deficiency relief.9 8 Although it is not strictly
necessary, some courts have found that gross inadequacy of price
"constitutes evidence of fraud, raises a presumption of fraud, unfairness, or mistake, or constitutes constructive fraud." 99 A bid of
sixty percent of property value is usually the uppermost limit of
the gross inadequacy exception. 0 0 But, typically, courts hold prices
below forty percent of value to be grossly inadequate.1 0 1 In Galleria I, the court found that a bid of 30 percent of original appraised value (not the value as of the sheriff's sale) fell within the
96. Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180 (1886); Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1896);
Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497 (5th Cir. 1989); Gottlieb v. McArdle,
580 F. Supp. 1523 (E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Worcester, 28 B.R. 910 (Bankr. Cal. 1983); Mason v. Wilson, 568 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. 1977); Wade v. Deniston, 21 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1929);
Lopez v. Bell, 24 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. App. 1962); Reed v. Westland Indus. Bank, 484 P.2d
1247 (Colo. 1971); Edward A. Lashins, Inc. v. Baumann, 201 So. 2d 495 (Fl. 1967), cert.
denied, 210 S.2d 221 (Fla. 1967); Wilson v. Citizens Bank, Peach County, 238 S.E.2d 754
(Ga. App. 1977); Elliott & Healy v. Wirth, 198 P. 757 (Idaho 1921); Block v. Hooper, 149
N.E. 21 (111. 1925); Fletcher v. McGill, 10 N.E. 651 (Ind. 1887); Johnson v. Funk, 297 P. 670
(Kan. 1931); Kitchen, Whitt & Co. v. Fannin, 115 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. 1938); Estate of Spears v.
Spears, 101 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. 1960); Guidarelli v. Lazaretti, 233 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1975)
(dictum); Morgan v. Linham, 86 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1956); Robert R. Wisdom Oil Co. v. Gatewood, 682 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. App. 1984); Fox v. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 220, 29 P.2d 663, 665
(1934); Golden v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989 (Nev. 1963); J.E. Linde Paper Co. v. Gebert, 105
A. 447 (N.J. 1918); Armstrong v. Csurilla, 817 P.2d 1221 (N.M. 1991) (recognizing both exceptions); Mauer v. Butler, 389 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1976); Swindell v. Overton, 314 S.E.2d 512
(N.C. 1984); Warren v. Stinson, 70 N.W. 279 (N.D. 1896); United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss,
793 P.2d 1359 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing both exceptions); Wagener v. Yetter, 124 A. 487 (Pa.
1924); Anderson v. Anderson, 266 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1970); Peoples Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
Graham, 352 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1987); Kinkaid v. Rossa, 141 N.W. 969 (S.D. 1913); Pentad
Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App. 1990); Watson v.
United Am. Bank in Knoxville, 588 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. App. 1979); Pender v. Dowse, 265
P.2d 644 (Utah 1954); Lovejoy v. Americus, 191 P. 790 (Wash. 1920).
97. Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 286, 76 P. 563, 565 (1904).
98. Washburn, supra note 88, at 863.
99. Id.; see American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Connor, 109 F.2d 871, 873 (4th Cir.
1940) (raising presumption of fraud, unfairness, or mistake); Kenly v. Huntingdon Bldg.
Ass'n, 170 A. 526, 528 (Md. 1934) (Digges, J., concurring) (dictum) (constituting evidence of
fraud); Butler v. Daum, 226 A.2d 261, 263-64 (Md. 1967) (constituting constructive fraud).
100. Washburn, supra note 88, at 865; but see Gumz v. Chickering, 121 N.W.2d 279,
285 (Wis. 1963) (finding 87% to be a gross inadequacy).
101. Washburn, supra note 88, at 866; but see Washburn, supra note 88, at 869-70 (in
the Fourth Circuit and in Delaware, the courts use 50% of value as the cutoff for gross
inadequacy).
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gross inadequacy of price exception,"0 2 and remanded the case for a
fair market value credit. '0 3 According to case law and statutes from
other jurisdictions, however, the more correct comparison of bid
price to value would define value as of the date of the sheriff's
sale."0 4 The record in Galleria I shows that the full appraisal (the
Stevens 1985 appraisal) closest to the date of the sheriff's sale (December, 1987) was for $1,100,000.105 Assuming that the court accepted the $1,100,000 valuation, which the Retirement Trust had
initiated but disclaimed as too high,1 16 the correct comparison
would then yield a bid-to-value percentage of 51 percent. It is unclear if the Montana Supreme Court found that a 50 percent-ofvalue bid fell within the gross inadequacy of price exception. Perhaps the Galleria I court thought it had no reliable evidence as to
value other than original appraisal value ($1,950,000), verified as it
was in the market by the original purchase price ($2,000,000).
While the Montana Supreme Court may have found that the
gross inadequacy exception applied to the facts of Galleria I, the
court might alternatively have found that the price was merely inadequate but coupled with additional circumstances, thus qualifying for the other exception. There are many possible additional circumstances used by courts to justify their refusal to confirm sale
prices. Among them are missed sale dates by mortgagor and other
minor misunderstandings between creditors and debtors regarding
the sale, improper "motive or position of the sale purchaser," and
the "status, disability, or business naivete of the debtor.'

0

7

Other

possible circumstances justifying vacating a sale include a substantial advanced bid made by a third party after the sale, ' 8 sale at a
substantially higher price by the purchaser to a third party'0 9 or
any other circumstances indicative of unfairness or irregularity.110
102. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 264, 780 P.2d at 616.
103. Id. at 265, 780 P.2d at 617.
104. Washburn, supra note 88, at 859.
105. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 255, 780 P.2d at 611; see Respondent and Cross-Appellants' Responsive Brief and Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal at 26, Galleria II, Mont.
819 P.2d 158 (1991) (No. 90-404) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
106. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 255, 780 P.2d at 611; see also Respondent's Brief at 39,
Galleria II (No. 90-404).
107. Washburn, supra note 88, at 862.
108. Blackburn v. Selma R.R., 3 Fed. Rptr. 689, 694 (1880); see Washburn, supra note
88, at 867-68.
109. Unruh v. Streight, 615 P.2d 247 (Nev. 1980); Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing,
Inc., 232 S.E.2d 667 (N.C. 1977); see Washburn, supra note 88, at 868.
110. Washburn, supra note 88, at 868. See Fletcher v. McGill, 10 N.E. 651, 654 (Ind.
1887), reh'g denied 11 N.E. 779 (Ind. 1887) (recognizing rule based on purchaser's unfairness to owner); Branck v. Foust, 30 N.E. 631, 633 (Ind. 1892) (requiring only slight unfairness when great inadequacy of price exists); see also Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Inade-
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Conceptually, fraud, misconduct, accident, mistake, unfairness and
surprise fall under the ambit of the mere inadequacy of price with
additional circumstances exception."' According to one leading
case, Graffam v. Burgess,"2 only "slight circumstances" are required when there is a "great inadequacy" of price.1 3 Additional
circumstances also may include a lack of competitive bidding, especially where the mortgagee is the sole bidder." 4 Another circumstance might be a collapsed real estate market resulting in a lack of
competitive bidding." 5 Often when the national or local economy
depresses land prices to the point that land is almost worthless,
only the mortgagee will bid at the foreclosure sale.
In Galleria I the Montana Supreme Court was silent as to
which circumstance might have prompted the court to find the
price inadequacy; indeed, the court was silent even as to which exception it relied upon in finding the price inadequacy. However,
the Montana Supreme Court could have relied upon several additional circumstances to justify a mere inadequacy with additional
circumstances exception. The court might have been troubled by
the apparent eagerness with which the mortgagee accelerated the
loan, perhaps falling under the category of "improper motive of
sale purchaser." ' 6 Another additional circumstance might have
quacy of Price as Basis for Setting Aside Execution or Sheriff's Sale-Modern Cases, 5
A.L.R.4th 794 § 4 at 802-09 (1981).
111. Some courts, however, deem these factors to constitute constructive gross inadequacy. See infra text accompanying note 123.
112. 117 U.S. 180 (1886).
113. Id. at 192.
114. See Bechtel v. Rocke, 5 N.E.2d 872, 874 (Ill. 1937) (where a second bidder, disqualified during the first sale, was allowed to purchase property on resale); Busey v. Perkins,
178 A. 254, 256 (Md. 1935) (dictum); Campbell v. Gardner, 11 N.J. Eq. 423, 429-30 (1857);
see also Washburn, supra note 88, at 888 ("Several courts have held that the sole additional
circumstance of mortgagee purchase is sufficient to set aside a sale where the sale price is
merely inadequate.").
115. Brand v. Woolson, 180 A. 293 (Conn. 1935); Detroit Trust Co. v. Hart, 269 N.W.
598 (Mich. 1936); Federal Title and Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 166 A. 538 (N.J.
1933); Young v. Weber, 175 A. 273 (N.J. 1934); Better Plan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Holden,
169 A. 289 (N.J. 1933); Teachers' Retirement Fund Ass'n v. Pirie, 46 P.2d 105 (Or. 1935);
National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973); John Davis
Estate, Inc. v. Rochelle, 42 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1935); Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556
(Wis. 1933); but see Kremer v. Rule, 257 N.W. 166 (Wis. 1934); see also Washburn, supra
note 88, at 875-83; but see 2 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 845 (1st ed. 1937)
("The real holding in [Suring], and it may be a very just holding, is that in an economic
depression such as the present one, the law will compel mortgagees to share a larger burden
of the common misfortune than would be required by observance of the traditional rules."
(emphasis in original)).
116. Washburn, supra note 88, at 862; id. at 852 ("During periods of local or national
credit stringency, the effect on borrowers is virtually the same as during the Depression.
Default rates can rise to critical proportions; mortgagees have economic incentives that en-
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been the "status, disability, or business naivete" 1 7 of some of the
Galleria Partners, a number of whom had a partnership interest of
less than 2 percent 1 8 and yet were encouraged by the former
owner of the Galleria into entering into a $1.2 million loan with
joint and several liability. 119 Similarly, another additional circumstance might have been the status, disability, or business naivete of
some of the partners who, as senior citizens, lacked any future
earning power and who had invested a significant portion of their
retirement savings in the Partnership. 2 ' Other possible circumstances are that the mortgagee was the sole bidder at the foreclosure sale' 2 ' and that the deteriorating Great Falls economy at the
time of the sale 22 in 1987 further restrained competitive bidding.
Because the Montana Supreme Court did not make explicit
whether the Retirement Trust's bid fell within the gross inadequacy of price exception or the mere inadequacy with additional
circumstances exception, it is difficult to evaluate the correctness
of its approach or any future approach the court might take. The
court may have felt no need to state its reasoning since the Retirement Trust's bid, at either 50 percent of current appraised value or
30 percent of original appraised value, fell within the-gross inadequacy exception. The court may have relied upon the exception of
mere inadequacy with additional circumstances because of the eagerness of the Retirement Trustee to accelerate the loan, the detecourage foreclosure rather than forbearance.") (emphasis added); GalleriaI, 239 Mont. at
255, 780 P.2d at 611 (regarding acceleration); see United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39,
42 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Depriving the [mortgagee] of potential 'double recoveries' created by
artificially large deficiencies that it has caused takes away nothing to which it is entitled.");
see also NELSON AND WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3, at 601 ("In times of depression, moreover, mortgaged property often sells for nominal amounts. The result is that the mortgagee
can purchase at the sale for less than the mortgage debt, resell the property at fair market
value and, in addition, attempt to realize on a deficiency judgment determined by the difference between the mortgage debt and the foreclosure sale price.").
117. Washburn, supra note 88, at 862; see e.g., Kloepping v. Stellmacher, 21 N.J. Eq.
328, 329 (1871) (regarding a sale for 2.5% of value where the debtors refused to believe that
their property could be sold for an eight dollar debt):
But when such gross inadequacy is combined with fraud or mistake, or any other
ground of relief, in equity it will incline the court strongly to afford such relief.
The sale in this case is a great oppression on the complainants. They are ignorant,
stupid, perverse, and poor. They lose by it all their property, and are ill-fitted to
acquire more. They are such as this court should incline to protect, notwithstanding perverseness.
118. Appellant's Initial Brief at 6, Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (No. 89029).
119. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 254, 780 P.2d at 610 ("Each of the borrowers was told
that the loan was nonrecourse.").
120. Appellant's Initial Brief at 6-7, Galleria I (No. 89-029).
121. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. at 256, 780 P.2d at 611.
122.

GalleriaII, -

Mont. at -,

819 P.2d at 162.
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riorating Great Falls economy, the fact that the mortgagee was the
sole bidder, the business naivete of some of the smaller investors
who participated jointly and severally with the larger investors, or
the status of the senior citizens who had invested much of their
retirement savings in the Partnership. Perhaps the best conclusion
to draw is that when the court reviews the facts of a foreclosure
case, all of the equitable matters together might lead the court to
find price inadequacy, whereas no particular fact could by itself
persuade the court to find inadequacy.
3.

The Future of Fair Market Value in Montana

In the recent case of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporationv. Hamilton,2 3 the court refused to invoke its equity
power to remand for fair market valuation. The court held that the
defendants' evidence was insufficient to show that the deficiency
judgment was unfair to the borrower.' 24 The defendants, Darwin
and Mary Hamilton, had borrowed $429,557 to develop a mobile
home subdivision.12 5 After making payments for three years, the
defendants defaulted.1 2 With two additional years of accrued interest, the total judgment came to $564,600.127 FSLIC v. Hamilton
is distinguishable from Galleria I, however, because plaintiff
FSLIC, the only bidder at the foreclosure sale, bid $475,000 on the
property, $45,443 more than the value of the underlying

obligation. 128
The Hamiltons argued that their property was worth more
than $1 million because they had already sold 17 of 81 mobile
home lots for $11,000 to $13,000.129 Citing Galleria I, the defendants requested that the court remand their case to the district
court to determine the fair market value of the property and recalculate the deficiency judgment. 130 The Montana Supreme Court
upheld the deficiency judgment, however, and refused to remand
on the grounds that a $475,000 bid on a property secured by a
$429,557 obligation was not unfair on its face, and defendants had
produced no evidence that the property was worth any more than
the underlying obligation would indicate.13 1
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

241 Mont. 367,
Id.
Id. at 369, 786
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370, 786
Id. at 370, 786
Id.

317, 786 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1990) [hereinafter FSLIC v. Hamilton].
P.2d at 1192.

P.2d at 1192-93.
P.2d at 1193.
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While distinguishing the Galleria I decision, in FSLIC v.
Hamilton the Montana Supreme Court implicitly challenged the
equitable powers basis of its GalleriaI decision by stating in dicta
that "[wle acknowledge that an issue not presented to the district
court will not be addressed on appeal. '11 2 The Hamilton court further challenged its Galleria I decision by restating the Galleria I
dissenting argument that there is no statutory authority for a fair
market value calculation of deficiency judgments.' 3 Although the
Hamilton court correctly found nothing wrong with the deficiency
judgment on its face, the defendant's contention that the property
was worth $1 million, as opposed to the $475,000 bid by the lender,
seems close enough to the facts of GalleriaI to have at least potentially warranted a similar remand for determination of fair market
value. The Hamilton court's remand refusal should signal to practitioners that the court's attitude has shifted toward denial of fair
market valuation credits.' 34
In dicta, the Hamilton court set forth the procedures it expected a defendant to follow in a lower court to qualify for a fair
market value determination of deficiency judgment.'3 5 The supreme court thus essentially imposed a procedural limitation on
Galleria I. Future defendants in foreclosure actions who believe
that they face an unfair deficiency judgment and hope to receive
judicial support for a fair market value determination should use
Justice Weber's statements as their check list. First, the defendants should "petition the District Court [for a hearing] in regard to
the adequacy of the sales price." ' 36 Second, the defendants should
submit to the Montana Supreme Court "relevant evidence of fair
market value on the date of sale." '3 7 Only then will the court take
up the question of the propriety of the amount of the judgment.
Although FSLIC v. Hamilton does not specify what proceedings
must occur below, Galleria I indicates that perhaps a hearing in
which both parties present expert appraisals of fair market value
38
would be appropriate.'
132. Id. (citing Wyman v. DuBray Land Realty, 231 Mont. 294, 299, 752 P.2d 196, 200
(1988)).
133. Id.
134. The Galleria I decision was authored by Justice John Sheehy who retired from
the court in 1991. Justice Sheehy did not sit on the court at the time of the FSLIC v.
Hamilton decision. It is interesting to note that Justice Fred Weber, who authored the 1990
FSLIC v. Hamilton decision, did not participate in the earlier Galleria I decision.
135. Hamilton, 241 Mont. at 371, 786 P.2d at 1193.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
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II

Background

1. District Court Procedure
In a preliminary hearing on December 13, 1989, District Court
Judge Leonard H. Langen outlined the procedures he expected
counsel for the Retirement Trust and Galleria Partnership to use
in the upcoming hearing to determine fair market value of the Galleria building.'3 9 Judge Langen expressed his expectation that each
side would present two or three appraisers, each of whom would
then be subject to cross-examination. ' " The district court expected the Retirement Trust to present its case first."' Although
the court asked the Retirement Trust to present its evidence first,
that fact did not determine which party had the burden of proof.""
In approval of -the district court decision and citing FSLIC v.
Hamilton,"3 the Montana Supreme Court stated that the Galleria
Partnership-and for that matter any mortgagor in a hearing to
determine fair market value vis-a-vis a foreclosure sale-carried
the burden of proof.'
Instead of receiving three to four hours of direct testimony
from each appraiser, the district court and counsel for both parties
agreed to have the appraisers submit their reports to the court and
then appear for cross-examination."15 The district court made explicit what it would be looking for on cross-examination.1 46 First, it
wanted an opportunity to determine generally "which [appraiser]
knew what he [was] doing. ' '" 47 Second, the district court wished to
know what "procedures [the appraiser] used and upon what [the
appraiser] based his figures."' 148 Finally, the court listed the three
typical parts of the appraisal: "comparable sales, which [the appraisers] may have a difficulty in finding; the income to the prop139. Transcript of Hearing Held by Long Distance Telephone Conference Call on December 13, 1989 at 2-3 (Appendix to Respondents' Brief), Galleria II (No. 90-404) [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing].
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. Galleria II, __ Mont. at -,
819 P.2d at 163.
143. 241 Mont. 367, 786 P.2d 1190 (1990).
144. Galleria II, __ Mont at __, 819 P.2d at 163.
145. Transcript of Hearing at 7, Galleria II (No. 90-404). This procedural deviation
may be responsible for some of the confusion in the district court and in the supreme court
regarding the basis used by the appraisers for their appraisals.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id..
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erty; and then I guess, to some extent the replacement value."1 9
There is no mention made in the record of this preliminary hearing
regarding the Galleria I requirement that the effects of foreclosure
1 50
should not reduce the fair market value of the property.
The district court held the fair market value hearing on March
2, 1990, and the court rendered an oral judgment from the bench
that "the fair market value of the foreclosed property at the time
of the Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale on December 8, 1987, was
$1,100,000."15
The court rendered its judgment on June 15,
1990."62 From this judgment the defendant Galleria Partnership
appealed and the plaintiff Retirement Trust cross-appealed.
2. Facts Related to the Appraisals
On remand, the district court heard testimony from appraisers
presented by the Retirement Trust and Galleria Partnership. 5 3
The Retirement Trust presented the testimony of one appraiser,
William Ferro, who had performed two appraisals of the property
in 1987-88, before the Galleria I court issued its instructions regarding valuation methods. This appraiser testified that these earlier appraisals were adequate for the district court's purposes in
1991. Galleria Partnership presented the testimony of one appraiser, Steven Hall, who had performed his appraisal in 1991.
Galleria Partnership also submitted into evidence a 1985 appraisal,
a critique of that appraisal, and relevant testimony from three
other witnesses.
The Retirement Trust's appraiser, William Ferro of Great
Falls, testified that the basis for his appraisal was "fair market
value," which he defined as the "most probable price ... for which
the appraised property [would] sell in a competitive market under
all conditions requisite to a fair sale with the buyer and seller each
acting prudently, knowledgeably and for self-interest, and assuming that neither [party was] under undue stress."' 5 Ferro testified
that he had twice appraised the Galleria property. 5 Ferro submitted his first appraisal to the Retirement Trust on November 9,
149. Id.
150. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
151. Memorandum Opinion of June 13, 1990 at 2 (Appendix to Appellants' Initial
Brief), Galleria II (No. 90-404).
152. Final Judgment as to Plaintiffs and Defendants Galleria Partnership (Appendix
to Appellants' Initial Brief), Galleria II (No. 90-404).
153. GalleriaII,__ Mont. at -,
819 P.2d at 161.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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1987, one month before the foreclosure sale. ' Ferro arrived at his
first appraisal by comparing the market values of similar properties in Great Falls and "deduct[ing] the costs of clean-up, maintenance, and renovation, ranging from $100,000 for general clean-up
and maintenance to $400,000 for major remodeling."15' 7 This appraisal valued the Galleria property between $256,000 and
$325,000.158
One month after the foreclosure sale, Ferro prepared a second
appraisal for the Retirement Trust's appeal to the State Tax Appeal Board. This January 1, 1988 appraisal valued the building at
$266,500 using an income approach." 9 According to the September
22, 1989 order of the State Tax Appeal Board, however, the Retirement Trust eventually stipulated to an appraised value of
$562,736."60 The stipulated appraisal value thus approximated the
Trustee's $565,000 bid at the December 8, 1987 foreclosure sale.
Steven Hall of Missoula testified for the Galleria Partnership
"that the 'intrinsic' value of the Galleria property as of December
1987 was $1,595,000. ' '16l Hall testified that the basis of his appraisal was the "consideration of the replacement cost new of a
property.. . allowing for the property's depreciation in the form of
physical deterioration, its functional obsolescence, if any, its anticipated serviceable life and the general usefulness of the item
involved." 6 2
Galleria Partnership submitted into evidence a second appraisal prepared by Thomas Stevens of Missoula.' Commissioned
by the Retirement Trust"" and dated August, 1985, this appraisal
valued the property at "$925,000 according to the income approach, $1,050,000 according to the cost approach, and $925,000
according to the market value approach."1 5 "The 'final indication
of value' was $1,100,000." ' 6 One of the Galleria partners, Allen
Bloomgren, testified that "he had expected the appraisal to be
about $1,500,000" and alleged that Stevens had performed his

-

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at -,
819 P.2d at 162.
163. Id.
164. Appellants' Reply Brief and Brief in Response to Cross-Appeal at 12, Galleria II,
Mont. -,
819 P.2d 158 (1991) (No. 90-404) [hereinafter Appellants' Reply Brief].
165. Galleria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 162.
166. Id.
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analysis improperly.'6 7 Stevens' appraisal did not, however, discount the effects of the foreclosure on the property because that
requirement would not be handed down until the 1989 Galleria I

opinion. 168

Galleria Partnership also submitted into evidence a critique of
the Stevens' appraisal that was prepared for the Retirement
Trust'69 by Ben E. Stanton of Bozeman, and dated November 11,
1985, one month before the Retirement Trust bid at the foreclosure sale. 7 ' Using the income approach to valuation, the Stanton
critique of the Stevens' appraisal valued the Galleria property at
$565,000.'' Stanton's critique contained the caveat that his valuation was based solely upon the data in the Stevens appraisal and
did not in itself constitute an appraisal.1 72 Like the Stevens appraisal, the Stanton critique did not take into account the effects
17 3
of foreclosure upon the property.
The Galleria Partnership then offered the testimony of Mick
Miller, "a Great Falls insurance agent for the company carrying
casualty insurance on the Galleria property," for the Retirement
Trust.'7 4 Using as a basis the replacement cost minus depreciation,
Miller explained why the Retirement Trust carried $1,950,000 in
insurance on the Galleria building.'75
Finally, the Galleria Partnership offered the testimony of its
former building manager, Darryl Meyer, who managed the Galleria
property before July, 1986.'17 Meyer testified to "the reluctance of
prospective tenants to rent space in the building after the foreclo7
sure proceeding was initiated" in April of 1985.'1
B.

The Holding: Fair Market Value.

The Montana Supreme Court examined the issue of whether
the "District Court abus[ed] its discretion in determining the value
of the Galleria property"' 78 and held that there was no abuse of
discretion because the district court satisfied two criteria. First, the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
Respondent's Brief at 7, Galleria II (No. 90-404).
GaUeria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 162.
Id.
Id.
Appellants' Reply Brief at 11-12, Galleria II (No. 90-404).
Galleria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id. at -,
819 P.2d at 162-63.
Id. at -,
819 P.2d at 163 (1991).
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district court based the fair market value determination on "substantial, credible evidence," and, second, the district court did not
reduce the fair market value by "the effect of judicial foreclosure
proceedings on the property's value." '79 As to the latter proposition, the text of the Galleria II holding is slightly ambiguous and
can be read in two ways. The opinion states: "We hold that the
District Court relied on substantial, credible evidence in determining the fair market value of the Galleria property, without taking
into consideration the effect of judicial foreclosure proceedings on
the property's value." 180 Read literally, one might argue that the
fair market value determination should be arrived at without taking into account the effect of foreclosure on the fair market
value-by considering only the fair market value at the time of
foreclosure sale. But a review of the text of the opinion reveals that
the court intended exactly the opposite-that fair market value
should be arrived at first by determining the fair market value and
then adding to that amount any losses in value attributable to the
effect of the foreclosure process.'
C. Analysis of the Method Used to Determine Fair Market
Value
The Montana Supreme Court faced five sub-issues in evaluating the Galleria Partnership claims and the Retirement Trust's
counterclaims regarding fair market value of the property. First,
the parties argued that the district court should have based its decision on one of the appraisals advocated by the parties. Second,
each party argued that the other party had used an incorrect definition of fair market value. Third, the parties argued in favor of
different appraisal methods, the Retirement Trust relying on market value and income approaches and the Galleria Partnership relying on the replacement cost approach. Fourth, the parties were
uncertain when their appraisals were supposed to have been prepared. Lastly, both parties held radically different views about
179. Id. at -,
819 P.2d at 165.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 295 (1985)
("'[Flair value' means the fair market value of the property, undiminished by any of the
disabilities that attend a judicial foreclosure sale.")(emphasis in original); see also id. at 300
("[W]e have been unable to find a single case which construes the statutory phrase 'fair
market value' to take into consideration the price-depressing effects of the foreclosure
proceedings.").
For example, if the fair market value at the time of a foreclosure sale is $80,000, but
there has been a $10,000 reduction in value due to foreclosure effects, the proper fair market
value would be $90,000.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/6

24

1992]

Bentwood: Deficiency Judgment Relief in Montana Foreclosures

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT RELIEF

which valuation losses should have been attributed to the foreclosure process.
The first issue relating to the fair market value determination
was whether the district court was bound to accept the appraisal of
either of the parties.'82 Although the Retirement Trust had argued
for the adoption of the Ferro appraisals and the Galleria Partnership had argued for the adoption of the Hall appraisal, the district
court adopted neither.' 3 Instead, the district court adopted the
dollar amount-if not the appraisal itself-of Stevens' 1985 appraisal for $1,100,000.8 " The district court was reluctant to adopt

the 1985 appraisal because the Montana Supreme Court had required on remand that December 8, 1987, the date of the sheriff's
sale, be the date used for valuation,' 85 and the Stevens appraisal
was performed in 1985. Because setting a fair market value is a
factual issue, the standard of review under M.R.Civ.P. 52(a) is
"clearly erroneous."'8 6 Citing Downing v. Grover,'17 the court
stated that a fact is not "clearly erroneous when based upon substantial credible evidence."' 88
Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the Montana
Supreme Court allows the district courts "broad discretion in valuation of real property."' 8 9 As long as there is some support for the
valuation in the record, the Montana Supreme Court will allow the
district court valuation to stand.'90 In addition to allowing district
courts to discount the appraisals advocated by the parties, the
Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that it permits averaging
the values of expert valuations.' The court also allowed the district court to disregard the Stanton critique of the Stevens ap182. Galleria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 163.
183. Accord, Union Nat'l Bank v. Crump, 37 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1944) (holding that trial
judges need not adopt any single expert opinion but may base fair market value on all the
evidence).
184. Memorandum Opinion of June 13, 1990 at 5 (Appendix to Appellants' Initial
Brief), Galleria II (No. 90-404) ("It is coincidental that the $1,100,000.00 figure which I
arrived at on March 10, 1990, was the same figure which was submitted by an appraiser
hired by the Trustees in 1985, after the Default Notice had been served, which appraisal the
Trustees refused to accept.").
185. Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617.
186. Galleria II, Mont. at -, 819 P.2d at 163.
187. 237 Mont. 172, 178, 772 P.2d 850, 853 (1989).
188. Galleria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 163.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also Tahoe Highlander v. Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 588 P.2d
1022 (Nev. 1979) (affirming district court's finding of fair market value of apartment
complex).
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praisal because it was "not based on an appraisal.' 192
Much of the difficulty the district court had in choosing the
best appraisal relates to the next sub-issue, determining what
meaning the appraisers should have given to the term "fair market
value." The Montana Supreme Court reiterated the Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd. 9 3 articulation of fair market value, as
meaning the "underlying" or "intrinsic" value of a property. 9
Noting that "foreclosure sometimes depresses the value of property,"' 9 5 the Montana Supreme Court stated that a determination
of fair market value "necessarily excludes the circumstances of the
foreclosure sale."' 96 The Montana Supreme Court noted that
on a fair
"[flew of [the Galleria II appraisals had] relied purely
9
7
done.1
have
should
they
as
analysis"
value
market
In its remand instructions, the GalleriaI court had stated that
the district court should determine the fair market value by arriving at the "intrinsic value of the real property with its improvements at the time of sale under judicial foreclosure, without consideration of the impact of the foreclosure proceedings on the fair
market value."' 98 The Galleria I opinion relies upon both
Chunkapura and Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd. for its definition of fair market value.' 99 This abstract definition of fair market value left the district court with little practical guidance in determining fair market value.2"' In Galleria II, the Montana
192. Galleria II, at -,
819 P.2d at 165. A full appraisal should consist of the comparable sales approach, the income approach, and the replacement cost approach, plus any
other factors that might affect the fair market value of the property. See, e.g. Harris Ominsky, Deficiency Judgments in Pennsylvania: The Lender's Gauntlet Revisited, 30 VILL. L.
REV. 1130, 1135 n.22 (1985):
In determining this price, courts might consider the following factors: (1) recent
sales of realty of comparable location and descriptions; (2) the uses to which the
subject property is adapted and might reasonably be adapted; (3) the demand for
the subject property and the demand for similarly situated realty; (4) income produced by the property; (5) all other elements that may affect the realty's actual
value.
(Quoting Union Nat'l Bank v. Crump, 37 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa. 1944)).
193. 209 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1985).
194. Galleria II, Mont. at -,
819 P.2d at 164.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1985)).
197. Galleria II,_
Mont. at -, 819 P.2d at 164.
198. Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 265, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (citing First State Bank of Forsyth v. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 61, 734 P.2d 1203, 1207 (1987)).
199. Chunkapura, at 61, 734 P.2d at 1207 (relying on Rainer, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298).
200. Appellants' Initial Brief at 7, Galleria II (No. 90-404) ("[Plresiding Judge Langen
specifically noted his obligation was to determine the 'intrinsic value' of the property pursuant to this Court's ruling and that he was not certain what that term meant, although he
recognized it to be something other than a standard fair market value approach."); id. at 9
("Ferro further testified he had never appraised the property on the basis of its intrinsic
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Supreme Court acknowledged that "the method of valuation was
left to the District Court." ' The court did approve the district
court's method of determining "intrinsic value," however, when it
affirmed the Stevens appraisal." '
The court's definition of fair market value is probably the
functional equivalent of the definitions used in most other jurisdictions. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in First Wisconsin National Bank of Oshkosh v. KSW Investments, Inc.203 defined fair value as the "price which a person willing and able to
buy the property would reasonably pay for it, not for purposes of
speculation, but for that use to which it has been or reasonably
° as
may be put." 04 The KSW court used "highest and best use 205
a
gloss on the "use to which [the property] has been or reasonably
may be put. 20 6 Both the Montana definition and the Wisconsin
definition rely on hypothetical information. More important, both
definitions strive to value the property without regard to the foreclosure process.
Not just the definition, but the overall method of the fair market value appraisal was in issue, however. Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court did not approve of any of the appraisal methods advocated by the parties. In reviewing the appraisals prepared by
Ferro, Hall, and Stevens the supreme court concluded that, together, the parties had given the district court all of the information necessary to the fair market value determination.' 7 Because
the appraisals were so disparate, the Montana Supreme Court
stated that the district court "was entitled to discount [all of] the
appraisals. ' 20 8 The district court's ultimate valuation price did
equal the Stevens valuation price. However, the district court
stated that it had not relied upon the 1985 Stevens appraisal in
20 9
making its valuation.
The Montana Supreme Court singled out and approved of the
Stevens appraisal as being the most thorough appraisal because it
had considered all possible approaches-the income approach, the
market approach, and the replacement cost approach-before it
value, and in fact did not even know what 'the term intrinsic value as being applied to real
estate in any way, shape or form' was.").
201. Galleria H, at -,
819 P.2d at 165.
202. Id.
203. 238 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. 1976) [hereinafter KSW].
204. Id. at 128.
205. Id. at 126.
206. Id. at 128.
207. Galleria II, __ Mont. at -,
819 P.2d at 165.
208. Id.
209. Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1992

27

Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 6

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

came to a final valuation. 210 The court minimized the fact that Stevens prepared his appraisal two years before the foreclosure sale
by stating that the earlier preparation date gave some assurance
that the effects of foreclosure had not yet had an impact on the
value of the property.
The issue of the timing of the Stevens appraisal forced the
Montana Supreme Court to decide when the parties' appraisals
should have been performed. The court acknowledged the district
court's right to rely upon an appraisal prepared two years before
the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court stated that:
[h]aving been completed after the Trustees foreclosure action was
filed, but two years before the foreclosure sale while the Galleria
building was still occupied and maintained, the Stevens' appraisal
may approximate most closely the value of the Galleria property
at the time of the sheriff's sale, without taking into account the
impact of the foreclosure proceedings.2 12
Although the appraisal should have arrived at the fair market
value of the property as of the date of the sheriff's sale, the appraisal itself may have been performed years earlier. Appraisals
prepared close to or before the mortgagee initiates foreclosure proceedings may be the most accurate in arriving at an intrinsic value
of a property and may provide a useful comparison for appraisals
which follow the initiation of foreclosure proceedings.
Finally, the court had to determine which impacts of foreclosure had diminished the property's intrinsic value. Losses of value
attributable to foreclosure include, but are not limited to, losses of
rental income,2"' mortgagee's failure to maintain and repair the
property," 4 the value reduction due to redemption rights, 21 5 and
the lack of an arm's-length transaction. 21 The Stevens appraisal
consisted of an income approach, a replacement cost approach, and
a comparable sales approach.21 7 Ultimately, the Stevens appraisal
settled on a dollar value slightly higher than any of the three indi210. Id.
211. Id.
819 P.2d at 165; see also Mellon Bank (East) Nat'l Ass'n v.
212. Galleria II, at -,
Pennsylvania Restaurant of A.B.E., Inc., 528 A.2d 654, 655 (Pa. 1987) (accepting appraisal
prepared three years before hearing for third party); First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Oshkosh v.
KSW Inv., Inc., 238 N.W.2d 123, 126 & n.1 (Wis. 1976) (accepting appraisal prepared one
year before foreclosure proceedings were initiated because the appraisal was based on the
highest and best use of the property).
213. Appellants' Initial Brief at 29, Galleria II (No. 90-404).
214. Id.
215. Rainer, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98.
216. Washburn, supra note 88, at 851.
819 P.2d at 162.
217. Galleria II, at -,
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vidual approaches. 21' The Stevens income approach may have been
flawed, however, due to the impact of foreclosure proceedings.
When the appraisal was prepared the property was already in foreclosure. Therefore, the property might not have been able to attract the number and quality of tenants it had attracted under
normal circumstances. 2 19 One of Galleria Partnership's witnesses
testified to the "reluctance of prospective tenants to rent space in
the building after the foreclosure proceeding was initiated. ' 220 It is
arguable that when the loss of tenants itself is the event that
caused the foreclosure, as was the case in the Galleria building,2 2 1
the accompanying loss of income should not be taken into account
when determining fair market value because that loss can be attributed to the foreclosure process.
An additional, more difficult, question is whether an economic
downturn in the national or local economy is an impact of foreclosure. According to the California Supreme Court, an economic
downturn is an impact of foreclosure if the downturn results in a
loss of a viable market for the property.2 22 In Rainer Mortgage v.
Silverwood Ltd., the court discussed debtor protection as developed during the Depression, noting that:
the Depression . . .severely reduced market values for real property. For many pieces of property there was no market at all. (citation omitted) Accordingly, giving the mortgagor a credit against
the deficiency judgment for the greater of the sale price or the
fair market value was often an empty protection.
The fair market value of the property was deemed an
insufficient measure as circumstances might conspire to render
valueless property which under normal conditions would have significant value .... The 'fair value' of foreclosed property is thus
223
its intrinsic value.
218. Id. at -'
819 P.2d at 163.
219. Appellants' Reply Brief at 10, Galleria II (No. 90-404). This is particularly true
in the Galleria fact situation, where the underlying reason for the foreclosure itself was an
extraordinary event affecting tenancy. The former owner of the Galleria, who had a financial
interest in most of the tenants, lost his financial ability to maintain those tenants' businesses. The ensuing inability of those tenants to pay their rents, all at the same time, was
the direct cause of the foreclosure. See Galleria I, 239 Mont. 250, 254, 780 P.2d 608, 610.
220. Appellants' Reply Brief at 10, Galleria II (No. 90-404).
221. Gafleria I, at 254, 780 P.2d at 610.
222. Rainer, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98; accord, Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W.
556, 557-58 (Wis. 1933); cf. REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 61.12.060 (allowing court to "take judicial notice of economic conditions, and after a proper hearing fix a minimum or upset price
to which the mortgaged premises must be bid or sold before confirmation of the sale.").
223.ScholarWorks
Rainer, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 297-98.
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If a national or local downturn in the real estate market results in
collapse of a market and a loss of competitive bidding at the foreclosure sale, then the economic downturn should not diminish the
intrinsic value of the foreclosed property. 2 4
D. Future Considerations
In the future, mortgagors should raise the inadequacy of a
foreclosure sale price at the district court level. Although not
strictly necessary in equitable foreclosure appeals, in FSLIC v.
Hamilton the Montana Supreme Court expressed its desire to see
the inadequacy proof presented in the district court. Galleria II
tells us that mortgagors will bear the burden of proof. In the district court, the mortgagor must show that the fair market value of
the property was, at the time of the sale, so much higher than the
bid price that one of two equitable exceptions apply. Mortgagors
must show that the price falls within either the gross inadequacy
exception or the mere inadequacy coupled with additional circumstances exception. To meet this burden of proof, the mortgagor
should use the Rainer definition of fair market value used in
Chunkapura and Galleria I and Galleria II: "the intrinsic value of
the real property with its improvements at the time of sale under
judicial foreclosure, without consideration of the impact of the
foreclosure proceedings on the fair market value."2 2' 5 The mortgagor also bears the burden of proving what losses in property value
can be attributed to the foreclosure process.
In the future, a careful mortgagee, particularly the sole bidder
at a foreclosure sale, should bid in an amount which will not fall
within either the gross inadequacy exception or the mere inadequacy with additional circumstances exception. A full fair market
value appraisal, based on the income, market, and replacement approaches and performed by an appraiser before the mortgagee initiates foreclosure proceedings, would provide some guidance in de224. Suring, 246 N.W. 556, 558 ("[Elconomic conditions are such as to preclude the
element of competitive bidding, and to make ineffective the ordinary and usual manner of
fixing the market value of the property."); see also Brand v. Woolson, 180 A. 293, 295
(Conn. 1935); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam, 268 N.Y.S. 674, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Federal Title & Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 166 A. 538, 541 (N.J. 1933); Teachers'
Retirement Fund Ass'n v. Pirie, 46 P.2d 105, 108 (Or. 1935); John Davis Estate, Inc. v.
Rochelle, 42 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1935); but see Weems v. McCloud, 619 F.2d 1081, 1091-92
(5th Cir. 1980) (dictum) ("It is no defense in Georgia if market values are depressed by
general economic factors."); Kremer v. Rule, 257 N.W. 166, 169 (Wis. 1934) (dictum); see
generally Sol Phillips Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic Depression, 20 VA. L. REV. 771 (1934).
225. Galleria II,__ Mont. at -, 819 P.2d at 164.
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termining a reasonable bid. The appraisal, whether performed
before or after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings, should not
diminish value by any current or projected effects of the foreclosure process.
District courts, when faced with similar valuation issues,
should reconsider the process by which the parties present valuation testimony to the court. In Galleria II, the district court faced
real difficulty when the plaintiff and defendant presented it with
disparate fair market valuations, each based upon a different definition of fair market value.226 Not only did the parties disagree on
the definition of the basic term, they also disagreed significantly on
the factual issue of the losses to the property associated with foreclosure. The latter issue was perhaps the crux of the Galleria II
fair market value litigation. Since the ultimate goal is to arrive at
appraisals for plaintiff and defendant that are truly comparable,
these definitions and the list of foreclosure losses need to be determined early on, preferably even before the appraisers prepare their
appraisals. A preliminary hearing or a pretrial conference might be
an appropriate point to come to some agreement on these matters.

IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The foreclosure sale process as it exists in Montana today does
little to assure a fair price for the debtor's property. The lack of
commercial sales procedures, such as listing, advertising, and showing the property to potential purchasers, virtually guarantees an
unfair price for the debtor's property.2 27 The Uniform Land Transaction Act'" recognizes this inadequacy and provides for commercial sale procedures in foreclosure sales.229 Similar provisions might
be considered by the Montana Legislature. The legislature also
should pass legislation to disallow both the deficiency judgment
and the statutory right to redemption when commercial indentures
are foreclosed under the Small Tract Financing Act. In fact, the
Montana Supreme Court has been asking the Montana Legislature
to turn its attention to deficiency judgments under mortgage fore819 P.2d at 164 ("Few of [the appraisers] relied purely on a fair mar226. Id. at -,
ket value analysis.").
227. See generally George M. Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured
by Land: Growing Disparity Among Functional Equivalents, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 37, 43
(1987) (noting three factors that reduce foreclosure prices: lack of arm's-length transaction,
inadequate notice to potential bidders, and mortgagee's credit advantage in bidding).
228. The Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA) was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1975 but has not been adopted by any
state. See Washburn, supra note 88, at 936-38.
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closure for several years.23 °
More importantly, the Montana Legislature should consider
legislation that would provide a fair market value credit for mortgagors,23 especially when the mortgagee is the purchaser. Perhaps
this anti-deficiency relief could be coupled with anti-redemption
relief for mortgagees. The Wisconsin fair market value credit statute, as quoted in KSW, might serve as a model for a Montana
statute:
Sec. 816.165(2), Stats

...

provides:

Application for confirmation of sale and for deficiency judgment:
(2) In case the mortgaged premises sell for less than the amount
due and to become due on the mortgage debt and costs of sale,
there shall be no presumption that such premises sold for their
fair value and no sale shall be confirmed and judgment for deficiency rendered, until the court is satisfied that the fair value of
the premises sold has been credited on the mortgage debt, interest and costs.2"2
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that the right to233reIt
demption is a useless right, seldom, if ever, used by debtors.
would probably be a fair exchange for debtors to give up some redemption rights in exchange for much-needed deficiency judgment
relief.
At a bare minimum, debtors need to be able to elect between
strict foreclosure and foreclosure by sale. After all, strict foreclosure was the starting point .from which the courts created judicial
230. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 64, 734 P.2d 1203, 1209 ("a subject which is deserving of the immediate attention of this legislature which is now sitting in session"); see also
Galleria 1, 239 Mont. 250, 257, 780 P.2d 608, 612 ("we recommended the attention of the
legislature... [but] the legislature has met twice in regular session since Chunkapura and
has undertaken no action regarding the subject").
231. The following states have statutes requiring a fair market value basis for deficiency judgments: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(A) (1990); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580a
(West 1992); id. § 726; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE §g 6-108, 451512 (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 27A.3170, .3280 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 40-457, -459 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (West 1991); N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36'(1991); ND.
CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
2621.1, .6 (Purdon 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-47-16, -48-14 (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-1-32 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.060 (1992); WIs. STAT. § 846.165 (1991). See
generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48
CAL. L. REV. 705 (1960); Jon W. Backes, Mortgages-North Dakota's Anti-Deficiency Statute Defined, 65 N.D. L. REV. 127 (1989).
232. KSW, 238 N.W.2d 123, 125-26.
233. Rainer, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 299; see William 0. Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.R. 420, 452 (reporting studies showing that only 0.927% of foreclosed properties are redeemed, only 7% of deficiency judgments are realized, and in 99.3%
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/6
of the public sales, the mortgagee is the lender).
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sales and deficiency judgments with the hope of benefiting debtors.
If mortgage reform cannot take a step forward, it might be preferable to allow debtors to choose to take the step backward into strict
foreclosure.
Perhaps a true step forward can be found in a recent proposal
to scrap the current foreclosure system in favor of one similar to
the British system. The British courts have never allowed mortgagees to bid in at foreclosure sales.23 Instead, a mortgagee must sell
the property to a third party in order to realize a return of investment. As Professor Berger suggests, the mortgagee would probably
sell the property at the highest possible price if some economic incentive to do so existed. '35 Allowing the mortgagee a percentage of
the excess profit above all liens, fees and commissions might provide such an incentive. Professor Berger also suggests that the
"percentage should range downward from perhaps 40% of amounts
up to $25,000, to 25% of amounts over $100,000. For very large
amounts, even a smaller percentage might be appropriate." '36 This
method of foreclosure allies the interests of the mortgagor and the
mortgagee. A high resale price rewards mortgagee with a profit on
the sale and returns a greater share of mortgagor's equity than if
the mortgagee made a low bid at a foreclosure sale.
Another recent scholarly proposal is to legislate mandatory resale reporting during the year following judicial confirmation of the
foreclosure sale.23 7 The mortgagee would submit a resale reporting
form to both the mortgagor and the court, and would detail both
the mortgagee's expenses and the mortgagee's profit on the sale.
The mortgagee would then return all profit less expenses to the
mortgagor. Professor Wechsler's proposal has the additional benefit of requiring a simple, out-of-court paper transaction. Professor
Wechsler argues that "[r]equiring mortgagees to fill out a standardized reporting form would be a small price to pay to reduce
the injustice of mortgagees retaining profits that belong to

mortgagors. "238
The message which the Montana courts have been trying to
convey to the Montana Legislature is that deficiency judgment relief is needed in Montana. A review of the statutes, cases, and
scholarship from other jurisdictions shows that there are solutions
234. Lawrence Berger, Solving the Problem of Abusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales,
66 NEB. L. REV. 373, 379 (1987).
235. Berger, supra note 234, at 379-80.
236. Berger, supra note 234, at 380.
237.. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 889-90.
Wechsler, supra
note 1, atof890.
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readily available to provide Montana's small businesses and commercial investors with the deficiency relief they need.
V.

CONCLUSION

In FSLIC v. Hamilton, the Montana Supreme Court has taken
a step away from its decision in Galleria I. Although Chunkapura
is still firmly in place with respect to occupied, single-family residential property, the court's interpretation of the Small Tract Financing Act as applied to commercial property is not yet clear. But
FSLIC v. Hamilton would indicate that the court will not look favorably upon any request for remand to recalculate a deficiency
judgment based upon fair market value.
If the court remains hesitant to remand for fair market value
calculations, commercial borrowers may find themselves unable to
recover their equity in foreclosure actions. In addition, commercial
borrowers may find that lenders are more likely to accelerate loans
and institute foreclosure proceedings than they were previously.
Eagerness to foreclose upon commercial deeds of trust may be the
end result of the Hamilton and Galleria II courts' reluctance to
remand for fair market value calculation of deficiency judgments.
Defaulting commercial borrowers might prevent the inequity of a
double recovery on the part of the lender by carefully documenting
the fair market value of the property at the time of foreclosure sale
and requesting that the lower court determine the equities between the parties in light of the fair market value. Using the Galleria II definition of "intrinsic value," the debtor should prove the
value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, undiminished by the effects of foreclosure. In the future, creating such
proof at the district court level may be required by the Montana
Supreme Court before it will entertain arguments regarding fair
market value.
Statutory anti-deficiency relief is available in other jurisdictions and should be made available to the small businesses and
commercial investors of Montana. Not surprisingly, this idea is not
popular with Montana lenders, who do not see themselves as making profits on mortgage foreclosures." 9 In truth, Montana lenders
may not make a net profit on mortgage foreclosures.2 40 But what
239. Hearings on S.B. 223 Before the Committee on Business and Industry, 52nd Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1991) (testimony of Jock 0. Anderson, Montana League of Savings,
Institutions).
240. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 853 n.19:
Local bankers and bank attorneys repeatedly expressed [the sentiment that niorthttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/6
gagees who purchase at foreclosure sales always suffer losses] . . . . These bank
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needs to be understood is that even the occasional profit by a
mortgagee visits an extreme hardship on an already distressed
mortgagor. In discussing this issue, Professor Wechsler states that:
Lenders probably will resist any change in the statutory process,
arguing that overall, losses on foreclosures exceed gains and that,
thus, they should be permitted to retain the occasional gain to
offset greater losses. This argument is not convincing. First, while
mortgagees may as a class sustain net losses on foreclosures, many
mortgagees achieve net profits. More importantly, each mortgage
transaction is independent of all others; a lender should not be
allowed to make up a loss on one transaction by unfairly retaining
a profit on a separate and unrelated transaction.
Lenders might also argue that the interest rates they charge
incorporate not only the anticipated losses, but the prospect of
occasional profits, and that the cost of credit would rise if they
were not allowed to retain those profits. The numbers and
amounts of these profits probably are not large enough to significantly affect the lending practices of major institutions. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to reduce interest rates generally, at
the expense of a relatively small number of financially distressed
homeowners. In this connection it is worth reemphasizing that
the drafters of our foreclosure by sale statutes never intended
lenders to receive these profits."4 '
Professor Wechsler's statements about New York homeowners
aptly describe the plight of Montana's small business and commercial investors, many of whom are unsophisticated and unable to
afford legal counsel at crucial stages of their business and real estate transactions. These small businesses and commercial investors
contribute significantly to Montana's economy and deserve the
protection of Montana's judiciary and legislature.

officials and their counsel, who work with mortgage foreclosures and the management and resale of properties acquired in foreclosure, appear to sincerely believe
that 'lenders always lose in foreclosures.' This may be because, when taken as a
group, losses do outweigh gains.... Bankers usually reacted with surprise at evidence of profits from the resale of foreclosed property and characterized such
profitable transactions as nonrecurring oddities.
241.ScholarWorks
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